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SYEDA FIZZA GILLANI 
 
Risk-sharing is a fundamental form of economic behaviour. It can occur through 
formal insurance markets, informal family arrangements, community support, legal 
institutions (such as bankruptcy), or government tax-transfer programmes. Whatever the 
mechanism used to share risk, the extent of risk mitigation can greatly influence the 
welfare of all members of society. Understanding the degree of risk-pooling in society is 
important for policy-makers, since insufficient risk pooling may provide a basis for 
government intervention. Alternatively, if risks are being pooled adequately without the 
help of the government, government risk-sharing may be redundant. 
This study explores the implications of the risk-sharing model, namely, that 
households which pool risks, either through formal markets or informal personal 
arrangements, experience correlated changes in their consumption through time. It 
conducts tests of within-village, across-village, within-district, and across-district risk-
sharing using a new Pakistani panel data set—the Pakistan Food Security Management 
Survey—collected by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), 
Washington, D. C. Unlike studies for other Less Developed Countries (LDCs), these 
tests find very little or almost no evidence of risk-sharing among unrelated individuals 
within- and across-villages in the rural sector of Pakistan. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Risk-sharing is a fundamental form of economic behaviour. It can occur 
through formal insurance markets, informal family arrangements, community 
support, legal institutions (such as bankruptcy), or government tax-transfer 
programmes. Whatever the mechanism used to share risk, the extent of risk 
mitigation can greatly influence the welfare of all members of society. Understanding 
the degree of risk-pooling in society is important for policy-makers, since insufficient 
risk-pooling may provide a basis for government intervention. Alternatively, if risks 
are being pooled adequately without the help of the government, government risk-
sharing may be redundant. 
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As an example, take the issue of life-span uncertainty. As documented in 
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981), individuals with a modest degrees of risk-aversion are 
willing to sacrifice significant fractions of their lifetime resources in order to gain 
access to actuarially fair life-span (annuity) insurance. If formal annuity markets are 
poorly developed, one might argue that the government should stimulate such 
markets by providing annuities through a social security system or similar institution. 
Before taking such steps, however, one should check whether communities are 
providing this form of insurance to their members. As Kotlikoff and Spivak 
demonstrate, significant risk-pooling does not necessarily require large numbers of 
risk-sharers. In the case of life-span risk, four or five community members can 
achieve the same level of the risk-pooling available with actuarially fair insurance. 
Individuals have an incentive to trade and share risk due to two sources of 
heterogeneity, i.e., (1) differences in individual households’ resources and (2) 
differences in individuals’ preferences. Risk-sharing involves a distribution of 
resources across households so that the weighted marginal utilities across households 
are equalised. The major implication of the risk-sharing model is that if households 
are sharing risk in a given pool, then individual household consumption will not be 
affected by any shock to its own resources. In fact, changes in any household’s 
consumption will depend on any shock to the collective resources of the risk-sharing 
pool. A sharing pool can be a few members of the same family, an extended family, a 
small village, a district or any other definition of a community. In the specific context 
of this study, only two definitions of the risk-sharing pool are being considered: the 
village and the district. 
Consumption data can help identify the magnitude of uninsured risks [see 
Kotlikoff and Pakes (1988)] and clarify the membership of a common risk-pooling 
group. Controlling for measurement error, demographic change, and trend growth in 
consumption, deviations in household consumption from one period to the next will 
reflect the resolution of economic uncertainties. Uninsured negative (positive) 
resource shocks will be associated with reductions (increases) in consumption. Such 
consumption innovations will be correlated among all members of a risk-sharing 
pool: since risk-sharers pool shocks to their collective resources, all members of a 
risk-sharing pool will experience a common resource shock, which, in very special 
circumstances, might correspond to the average resource shock experienced by 
members of the risk pool. 
The lack of panel data on consumption has limited economists to studying the 
magnitude of risks and the extent of risk-sharing. In the U.S., for example, the only 
long panel on consumption is provided by the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID), and the consumption measured in the PSID consists only of food at home 
and food away from home. In the case of Less Developed Countries, the existence of 
panel data is very rare; one exception is the Pakistani Food Security Project’s Panel  
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data. The Pakistani Food Security Survey was conducted over three years, during 
which there were twelve interviews of each household. In each interview, a detailed 
set of information related to the consumption patterns of the household was collected. 
For the purpose of studying risk-sharing, this survey appears to be one of the best 
available for the LDCs. 
This paper is divided into the following sections. Section II reviews the 
existing literature. Section III-a discusses the experimental design and derives the 
model for risk-sharing when the sharing pool is defined as a village. Section III-b 
discusses the implications of the risk-sharing model for the case when the risk-
sharing pool is defined as one specific district. Section III-c discusses the 
econometric specifications of the model and points out various problems involved in 
estimations. This section also outlines the testable implications of the model. Section 
IV presents the empirical results; IV-a presents results of within-and across-village 
risk-sharing and IV-b presents results of within and across-districts risk-sharing. 
Section V concludes the study. 
 
II.  REVIEW OF EXISTING LITERATURE 
This section surveys recent theoretical and empirical work on the implications 
of risk-sharing models. The focus of the survey is mainly on the tests based on 
consumption and income. 
The implications of risk-sharing are emphasised in the early work by Wilson 
(1968). Micro consumption data has been used in several recent papers to test for 
altruism and/or risk-sharing. Andrew and Kotlikoff (1988) point out that altruism 
implies correlated consumption changes across cohorts. On balance, their tests, 
which use cohort data compiled from the on-going U.S. Consumer Expenditure 
Survey, reject altruism. Their results are also at odds with the prediction of perfect 
risk-sharing models. 
Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1989) use the U.S. Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics (PSID) extended family data. This survey reports the consumption and 
incomes of parents and their adult children who are members of different households. 
Altonji et al. examine (1) the static implication of altruism that extended family 
members will share their initial level of resources, and (2) the dynamic implication of 
risk-sharing (whether altruistically motivated or not) that extended family members 
will share shocks to their resources. The data quite strongly reject such resource 
sharing; i.e., they reject both altruism and risk-sharing. 
Other studies that examine risk-sharing using consumption data in the U.S. are 
Mace (1991) and Cochrane (1991). Mace and Cochrane use Consumer Expenditure 
Survey and the PSID, respectively, to test for perfect risk-sharing in the U.S. 
economy, which would imply correlated changes in consumption across different 
households. Mace uses two different specifications of the individual’s utility 
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function. She accepts the risk-sharing proposition for one of the specifications 
(exponential utility) while rejecting it for the other specification (power utility). 
Cochrane tests the proposition of full insurance by cross-sectional regressions of 
consumption growth on a variety of exogenous variables. He rejects full insurance 
for long illness and involuntary job loss, but not for spells of unemployment, loss of 
work due to strike, and an involuntary move. 
Research on risk-sharing in LDCs using the new methodology has just begun. 
Townsend (1989) has examined consumption changes and risk-sharing in India. He 
uses indirect measures on the consumption of the households within three villages in 
India to test for risk-sharing. His consumption measure is derived by subtracting an 
estimate of saving from an estimate of income. While his consumption variable is 
clearly measured with error, he nonetheless finds that changes in the consumption of 
individual households within each of the three villages are highly correlated, even 
though income changes of villagers differ dramatically. Indeed, Townsend reports 
that controlling for average village consumption, the consumption of individual 
households does not, in general, depend on their own incomes. Given the significant 
measurement error in Townsend’s data and the fact that he is considering only 40 
households (albeit with 10 annual observations on each), one should not, perhaps, 
make too much of this single study; yet the results are intriguing. Townsend’s finding 
of significant risk-sharing within villages in India appears to differ from 
Rosenzweig’s (1988) findings (as discussed in the next section). 
Paxon (1988) and Deaton (1989) also studied the response of LDCs 
households to income fluctuations. Their focus, however, is on the use of savings 
rather than risk-sharing arrangements to smooth consumption in the presence of 
income shocks. 
Rashid (1990), using household consumption data from a survey of the year 
1985-86 by the Government of Pakistan, analysed risk-sharing across farm 
households in different communities of Pakistan. She concludes that the individuals 
living in a community are able to insure completely against idiosyncratic shocks, but 
they are not able to smooth consumption across these communities. In her study, the 
measure of the community-wide shock is just the difference between the 
community’s current and permanent income, where community’s (permanent and 
current) income is just the individuals’ (permanent and current) incomes added 
together. This measure of community-wide shock actually picks up community’s 
fixed effects; hence it is another component of permanent income. In summary, 
though her study suffers from definitional and measurement problems, it is the first 
attempt to analyse risk-sharing behaviour in Pakistan. 
The theoretical relationship between consumption, savings, income and risk-
sharing has been discussed in the previous section. Literature gives us very mixed 
results of whether income risks are being pooled across the households (risk-sharing)  
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or the households are smoothing their consumption over time using their savings and 
assets (consumption smoothing). To summarise, the evidence on risk-sharing, which 
is a first-order issue in economics, is unfortunately quite meagre, both for the DCs 
and LDCs. 
 
III-a  TESTING WITHIN- AND ACROSS-  
VILLAGE RISK-SHARING 
As mentioned above, the changes in consumption over time of a household 
that pools risk with other households (whether for altruistic or selfish reasons) will 
depend on the collective resource shock of all households in the risk-sharing pool, 
rather than on the resource shock of the individual household. Thus, for households 
pooling risk there is a common factor determining changes in consumption over time. 
As described in Andrew and Kotlikoff (1987) and Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 
(1989), this common factor is the change in the marginal utility of income. For 
estimation purposes, the change in the marginal utility of income can be treated as a 
fixed effect. If we control for this fixed effect as well as for demographics, the 
implication of within-village risk-sharing is that each household’s consumption 
change will be uncorrelated with its change in resources which we proxy by the 
change in income. 
To clarify these statements, consider the following specification for the utility 
of household i in village j at time t: 
Ui, j ,t = P  
C
( )a, i, j, t a, i, j, ta






1  ... ... ... (1) 
In (1) Ui, j, t is the utility of the ith household in village j at time t, Pa, i, j, t is the 
number of members of the ith household who are age a (where a runs from zero to D, 
the maximum age in the household) at time t, θa, i, j, t is the weight attached by the 
household to the consumption of an age a member of the household at any point in 
time, and Ca, i, j, t is the consumption of a member of the ith household who is age a at 
time t. The utility function in (1) is assumed to be isoelastic. 
In Equation (1) household utility function is written as a function of the total 
consumption of all the members of the household at time t. Total consumption of the 
household is simply the sum of all members’ consumption, i.e., 






Pa, i, j, t Ca, i, j, t. ... ... ... ... (2) 
To find the optimal allocation of resources among the individual members of 
the households, maximise Equation (1) subject to (2). Substituting the demand 
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function for the Ca, i, j, t’s back into Equation (1), the utility function of the ith 
household in village j at time t can be written as an indirect function of Ci, j, t , viz.:1 







γ( )  ... ... ... ... (3) 
where: 












The expected intertemporal utility for the ith household is the expectation of 
the sum of the household’s intratemporal utilities weighted by a time preference 
factor. The summation runs from time t to ∞. Thus, 
 













ρ)  ... ... ... (4) 
 
where Et is the time t expectation operator, ρ is the rate of time preference, and Hi, j, t 
is the expected utility of the ith household. Note that the demographics of the 
household enter through the Ui, j, s’s. This specification encompasses the possibility 
that future demographics, i.e., the future values of the βi, j, t’s, are uncertain. 
Uncertainty with respect to demographics arises because of the life-span uncertainty 
of individual household members as well as the uncertainty with respect to the 
household’s future fertility. 
If the households within village j are efficiently sharing risk, their risk-sharing 
behaviour can be described as the maximisation of a weighted sum of the values Hi, j, t 
where the weights attached to each household i’s expected intertemporal utility will 
reflect the initial resource distribution among the risk-pooling households as well as 
their relative bargaining abilities. Households with more initial resources or better 
bargaining abilities will, presumably, receive a higher weight, δi, j in the maximand 
given in (5). 
 








 ... ... ... ... ... (5) 
 
where 0<δ<1 and sum of δ is equal to 1. Nj is the total number of households 
included in the risk pool. In considering this maximand, it is important to keep in 
mind that while the risk-sharing arrangements can be characterised as the solution to 
1For derivation of this result, see Appendix 1. 
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a planning problem, there is certainly no need to have a social planner effect the 
solution. The maximisation of (5) simply means that the risk-sharing arrangements 
made by the risk-sharers will be Pareto-efficient. 
Total consumption by the risk pool in village j at time t, Cj,t equals the sum of 
the consumption of all households in the risk pool, thus: 






 … ... ... ... ... ... (6) 
At any point in time the maximisation of (5), subject to the collective 
intertemporal budget constraint of the risk pool, must satisfy static first-order 
conditions. These static first-order conditions arise from maximising (5) subject to 
(6), taking Cj, t which is determined in the global optimisation, as given. These static 
first-order conditions2 can be expressed as: 
δi, j βi, j, t Ci, j,t−γ  = δk, j βk, j, t Ck, j,t−γ  = λj, t … … … (7) 
where λj, t is the shadow price of the Equation (6) constraint, i and k index two 
different households, and j stands for the risk-sharing pool. This static first-order 
condition, which holds regardless of the type of uncertainty and budgetary 
constraints (including liquidity constraints) facing the risk-sharing pool, characterises 
the relative allocation of consumption between households i and k within village j. It 
is obvious that the division of the consumption between the households depends on 
the individual households’ weight. In addition, since there is a single budget 
constraint in this problem, the weighted marginal utility of each household’s 
consumption will be equated to the same shadow value of the budget constraint at 
each point in time. Hence, changes over time in the weighted value of each 
household’s marginal utility will equal the changes over time in these shadow prices. 
Since the shadow prices (λt) and their changes are not household-specific, the 
weighted ratio of changes in marginal utilities of consumption will be the same for 
each household. 
To clarify this last point, consider Equation (7), but updated for time t+1: 
δi, j βi, j, t+1 Ci, j,t+− 1γ = δk, j βk, j, t+1 Ck, j,t +− 1γ = λj,t+1 … … (8) 











+ +1 1  log ( )ββ
i, j,t
i, j,t
+1  ... (9) 
2For derivation of this result, see Appendix 2.
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and for any kth household: 










+ +1 1  log ( )ββ
k, j,t
k, j,t
+1  … ... (10) 
A comparison of Equations (9) and (10) indicates that, controlling for changes 
in the household’s demographic composition (the ratio of the β’s), risk-pooling 
implies equal percentage changes in the consumption of each household in the risk-
sharing pool. If households in village j are sharing risk, this implies that, controlling 
for demographic change, all households in village j should experience an equivalent 
percentage change in consumption from one period to the next, independent of the 
particular household’s changes in income. 
 
III-b  Risk-sharing within and across Districts 
The implications of the risk-sharing model are also tested by considering a 
broader definition of the risk-sharing pool, i.e., when the risk-sharing pool is defined 
to be a district rather than a village. Pakistan is divided into four provinces. One of 
the provinces was deleted from the sample after the fourth round because of some 
administrative problems. The rest of the sample consists of one district each from the 
N.W.F.P. and Sindh provinces and two districts (one rural and one urban) from the 
province of Punjab. All four districts in the sample have very distinct economic and 
social characteristics. All of them have different weather patterns, different soil types, 
different crop seasons, and hence different sources of incomes. Based on these facts, 
this study uses the model of risk-sharing to check the evidence of risk-sharing within 
and across districts as well as villages. In these regressions, the villages’ fixed effects 
are replaced with district-level fixed effects and testing of the risk-sharing model has 
been continued as discussed earlier. 
 
III-c  Econometric Specification 
Let Cmi, j, s stand for measured consumption of household i, in village j, at time 
s. We assume that Cmi, j, s = Ci, j, s µi, j, s where Cmi, j, s stands for measured consumption 
and µi, j, s is a measurement error. Using two first-order conditions for a given 
household for time t and t+1, respectively, i.e., 
for time t 
δi, j βi, j, t (Cmi, j, t /µi, j, t)–γ = λj,t ... ... ... ... (11) 
for time t+1 
 
δi, j βi, j, t+1 (Cmi, j, t+1 /µi, j, t+1)–γ = λj,t+1 ... ... ... ... (12) 
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taking  the log of both sides of the two equations 
log δi, j + log βi, j, t –γ log Cmi, j, t +  γ log µi, j, t = log λj,t  ... ... (11)′ 
 
log δi, j + log βi, j, t+1 –γ log Cmi, j, t+1 +  γ log µi, j, t+1 = log λj,t+1  … (12)′ 























 ... (13) 
 As discussed earlier, the shadow prices λj,t’s are not household-specific; they can be 
treated as fixed effects of the village and then dummy variables for each village can 
be used to capture these effects. Hence setting 





( )+  
takes care of the village fixed effects. The term Dj,t+1 stands for a vector of time- and 
village-specific dummy variable, and τ is the corresponding vector of coefficients. In 
this specification, the village- and time-specific dummy variables control for the 
village- and time-specific dummy value of log(λj,t+1/λj,t). The change in the 
household demographics term (second term of the right-hand side of 13) is the vector 
of changes in household demographics. Let us define 





( )+  
where X′i, j, t  is a vector of changes in household characteristics, and φ is a vector of 
corresponding coefficients. The examples of household characteristics are the 
number of different household members in different age-sex cells, the household 
head’s age, education, and marital status, and the number of guests during the period 
t as well as t+1. Substituting all of these components back into Equation (13), the 
econometric specification of the model becomes: 





+1 = X′i, j, t φ + D′j,t+1 τ + ψ log ( )YY
i, j,t
i, j,t
+1 + ∈i,  j,  t ... (14) 
In (14) Yi, j, t stands for the current income of household i in village j at time t. The 
term log (Yi, j, t +1/ Yi, j, t) is included to test the within-village risk-sharing hypothesis. 
Finally, ∈i, j, t = log (µi, j,t+1/µi, j, t) is the error term in the model. According to the  
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within-village risk-sharing hypothesis, controlling for the common village resource 
shock, which is fully captured by log (λj,t+1/λj,t) (the D′j,t+1) vector in the regression), 
the change in income experienced by a particular household in the village should not 
be significant; i.e., under the null hypothesis ψ=0. Under the alternative hypothesis 
of no village risk-pooling, the village- and time-specific dummies will not control for 
household i, j, t’s particular resource shock, and ψ should be a significant positive 
coefficient, since some component of the change in the household’s income between 
the two periods, presumably, will be unanticipated. 
Equation (14) can be estimated in the cross-section. Alternatively, the data can 
be pooled over time by using a set of equations together to control for serial 
correlation in the ∈i, j, t’s induced by the fact that the dependent variable in (14) for 
period t and t+1 contains the common error term, log (µi,j,t+1/µi, j, t). However, this 
study uses only cross-section estimations, i.e., using only two years in each 
regression. 
Notwithstanding Townsend’s findings, the notion of perfect risk-sharing 
within the village strikes as implausible. Hence, it is expected to find a non-zero 
value of ψ. The interesting question may not be if the estimated value of ψ is 
precisely zero, but if the value of ψ is significantly different whether or not one 
controls for the village fixed effects. If controlling for the village fixed effect makes 
little difference to the estimated value of ψ, this would suggest essentially no risk-
sharing among households within the village. If, on the other hand, the coefficient ψ 
is substantially smaller as a result of controlling for the fixed effects, this would be 
indicative of substantial risk-sharing by the village. 
In the case of risk-sharing across villages, it will also be interesting to 
determine whether the different components of the τ coefficient vector are 
significantly different. A finding of significant difference would rule out risk-sharing 
across villages, which Rosenzweig (1988) and Rosenzweig and Stark (1989) have 
stressed as quite important. Again, while it is likely to reject the equality of all the τ 
coefficients, and thus formally reject perfect across-village risk-sharing, if the 
variance in the τ coefficients is large compared to the variance of the dependent 
variable in (14), this would suggest quite different income shocks across villages—
another point stressed by Rosenzweig (1988) and Rosenzweig and Stark (1989)—
combined with little or no risk-sharing across villages. 
Income here is taken to be exogenous. If leisure enters the utility function, it 
may be inappropriate, depending on the precise form of the utility function to use 
income, inclusive of labour income, to test the model. Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff 
(1989) discuss the issue of variable labour supply at length and indicate how one can 
use lagged wage rates and assets in tests of risk-sharing if the labour supply is 
endogenous. Since the IFPRI data sets include wage rate and asset information, these 
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can be used to test within-village risk-pooling. However, in this study, since the 
utility function does not include the leisure term, the income is taken as exogenous. 
Another issue considered at length in Altonji et al. is the issue of the 
household utility function. Altonji et al. demonstrate that there is a very large class of 
utility functions delivering log (Ci, j, t+1/Ci. j. t) as the dependent variable in Equation 
(14). They and Browning, Deaton, and Irish (1985) also characterise the class of 
utility functions that delivers the first difference (Ci, j, t+1 – Ci. j. t) as the dependent 
variable in Equation  (14). Equation (14) has been estimated both in logs and in 
levels. In the case of the level regressions change in income is used, rather than the 
proportional change in income, to test risk-sharing. Since consumption data is fairly 
detailed, Equation (14) is tested for sub-components of consumption as well as more 
aggregated measures of consumption. 
This study uses a household level data set collected by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), Washington, D. C. The IFPRI survey is a panel 
survey of the households in the rural sector of Pakistan. The data were collected from 
four districts in Pakistan. With the exception of the district of Faisalabad, the survey 
focused on households in Pakistan’s poorest districts.3 As documented in Alderman 
and Garcia (1993), and Adams (1992), this data set is not a representative of rural 
Pakistan as a whole. 
 
IV.  EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND RESULTS 
In empirical analysis, the income variable has been used as the sum of farm 
and non-farm wages, rental earnings and net crop profits, net returns to capital, and 
the zakat and pension received.4 Remittances or other transfers received are not 
included in income here, because some transfers may be responses to individual 
household’s income shocks. 
Empirically, for the test of within-village risk-sharing, I test the hypothesis 
 H0 : ψi = 0 
 H1 : ψi ≠ 0 
Here ψi are the coefficients of changes in income in the dynamic tests. For the testing 
of across-villages risk-sharing, the following null hypothesis is tested, 
 
  H0 : there is perfect risk-sharing across villages (i.e., all τi’s are equal). 
  H1 : there is no risk-sharing across villages (i.e., at least one of the τi’s 
is not equal). 
3For a detailed discussion on the sample selection and the data collection procedures, see 
Alderman and Garcia (1993). For variable definitions and summary statistics, see Gillani (1994). 
4In the sample, total income is negative for some households. Since we are dealing with the log of 
the ratios, the households with negative as well as zero incomes are not included in the analysis. 
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Here τi’s is the vector of coefficients related to village fixed effects and testing 
this hypothesis implies testing across villages. 
 
IV-a  Results of Risk-sharing Within 
and Across Villages 
This section reports the empirical results obtained from fixed effect and non-
fixed effect tests of the risk-sharing model. In this section, total income used is 
defined as in the previous section. The total consumption variable used is the total 
non-durable (current expenditures) consumption by the households. Total food 
consumption as well as all other current consumption by the household is included in 
the total consumption variable. For household demographics, the change in 
household size, the change in total number of meals taken outside the household by 
all household members, and the change in total number of visitors are included. 
Change in total consumption is regressed on the changes in own income and the 
changes in household demographics along with village fixed effects. 
Empirical results reject the predictions of the risk-sharing model; namely, after 
controlling for village fixed effects, coefficients for the changes in own incomes 
should be zero. In estimation, most of these coefficients are significant and positive. 
The first two columns of Table 1 are the results from the fixed-effects model in the 
cases of log and levels regressions. Columns 3 and 4 present the results of the model 
without the village fixed effects in regressions. Most of the coefficients from both 
forms are significant and positive. The value of the coefficients is less in cases of 
without-fixed effects than in non-fixed effects results, but the difference is very 
small, i.e., controlling for the village fixed effects does not reduce the effect of the 
changes in income substantially. As discussed earlier, this rules out the possibility of 
risk-sharing within villages. The last column of Table 1 shows values of F tests.5 
These F tests are included to test the hypothesis of across-villages risk-sharing. 
These F tests reject the null hypothesis that the τ coefficients in the model are not 
significantly different from each other, i.e., the possibility of risk-sharing across 
villages in the sample is rejected. The last two rows of the table show the minimum, 
the maximum, and the mean value of the coefficients of the village fixed effects. The 
mean value of fixed effects is greater in the regression of years one and two than in 
the regressions of years two and three. 
5F tests in this case is defined as 
 
F(J,T–K–J) = ( )
( )
SSE SSE / J




− −  
where SSER is the residual sum of squares from the model without fixed effects, SSEU is the residual sum 
of squares from the model with fixed effects, J is the total number of fixed effects (we have a total of 44 
villages in our sample, so J in this case in (43) included in the model, T is the total number of 
observations, and K is the number of parameters estimated, excluding fixed effects.
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Table 1 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-villages 
Total Expenditures and Total Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
 Logs Levels Logs Levels F-test 
Change in Income 




















Change in Household Size     


















Village Fixed Effects 
Coefficients+ 
     
 Minimum Maximum Mean   




0.234   




–0.028   
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 + Using log form of the equations. 
In Table 2, the exercise of Table 1 is repeated with the difference that here 
non-crop income instead of total income is used. The village fixed effects again do 
not have a strong effect on the values of own income coefficients, and most of the 
income coefficients are significant and positive, though small in magnitude. 
The interest here is to check whether or not the data supports the risk-sharing 
hypothesis for different components of consumption. Next, the fixed-effects model 
has been tested,  using changes  in  food consumption instead of total consumption of  
the household. Table 3 reports the results of this model. In this table, total income is 
defined as in Table 1. The dependent variable, i.e., food consumption, includes food 
received as gifts/wages/own production. The demographics list is the same as in 
previous tables. Results in this table again reject the risk-sharing hypothesis. Most of 
the own income coefficients are highly significant and are positive, though small in 
value. In this case, mean value of the village effects is also positive for both 
equations. These results again do not support the risk-sharing hypothesis, i.e., after 
controlling for the village fixed effects, the own income coefficients only change 
slightly in magnitude. In all of these tests, household’s own income is being taken as 
exogenous. Since utility function used in these tests does not include the utility of the 
leisure term, labour income is included in total income to test the risk-sharing model. 
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Table 2 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-villages 
Total Expenditures and Non-crop Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
 Logs Levels Logs Levels F-test 
Change in Income 




















Change in Household Size     


















Village Fixed Effects 
Coefficients+ 
     
 Minimum Maximum Mean   




0.249   




–0.029   
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 + Using log form of the equations. 
Table 3 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-villages 
Food Expenditures and Total Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
 Logs Levels Logs Levels F-test 
Change in Income 




















Change in Household Size     


















Village Fixed Effects 
Coefficients+ 
     
 Minimum Maximum Mean   




0.299   




0.032   
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 + Using log form of the equations. 
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Table 4 repeats the above exercise, with the change that here only changes in 
food expenditure and changes in non-crop income are used instead of changes in 
total income. The idea is that non-crop income is supposed to be more stable than the 
total income, which includes crop income. Here again, food expenditures include the 
food received as gifts/wages/own production. The results are similar to those in the 
previous table. Most of the income coefficients are highly significant and positive in 
both forms. This implies that if we take only changes in food expenditures against 
changes in non-crop income, the changes in households’ own non-crop income still 
have positive and significant effects on the changes in consumption. Again, 
controlling for village fixed effects does not change the own income coefficients in 
magnitude. 
Table 4 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-villages 
Food Expenditures and Non-crop Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
 Logs Levels Logs Levels F-test 
Change in Income 




















Change in Household Size     


















Village Fixed Effects 
Coefficients+ 
     
 Minimum Maximum Mean   




0.279   




–0.023   
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 + Using log form of the equations. 
Another way to test the hypothesis of perfect risk-sharing is to use non-
durable expenditures, excluding food expenditure, in the model. The examples of 
these expenditures are expenditures on ceremonies, functions, weddings, clothing, 
and entertainment. These are the type of expenditures where one expects to see a 
type of positive evidence of risk-sharing within villages. The results from these 
regression are presented in Table 5. In this case, coefficients for the years 2 and 3 
regression do reject the hypothesis of risk-sharing but they are not significant, and 
coefficient for the years 1 and 2 regression becomes negative after controlling for 
village fixed effects; so a conclusion can not be reached in this case. 
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Table 5 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-villages 
Non-durable Expenditure (Excluding Food) and Total Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
 Logs Levels Logs Levels F-test 
Change in Income 




















Change in Household Size     


















Village Fixed Effects 
Coefficients+ 
     
 Minimum Maximum Mean   




–0.102   




–0.239   
t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 + Using log form of the equations. 
In all of these tables, the F statistics is included to test the risk-sharing across 
villages. As discussed earlier, the hypothesis of the non-equality of all components of 
τ vector is rejected on the basis of F tests, i.e., in all cases, the null hypothesis of 
perfect risk-sharing across villages is rejected. 
 
IV-b  Results of Risk-sharing within and across Districts 
Tables 6–9 present the results of the risk-sharing model when the risk-sharing 
pool is defined as a district rather than a village. For risk-sharing within districts, all 
households from one district have been used in the regression, including village 
effects for only that district. Table 6 presents the case when total income and total 
consumption are used. The first four rows present each district’s fixed and non-fixed 
effects for years one and two, and the last four for years two and three. The results 
for District One reject the hypothesis of a risk-sharing model for both years, i.e., 
most of the income coefficients are significant and positive. Although these 
coefficients are smaller when the village fixed effects for this district are included, 
yet the difference is very small. In this sample, District One is the district of 
Faisalabad of Punjab province, which was included in the survey as a relatively 
prosperous rural district. For District Two, two out of four coefficients are significant 
(in log form of equation) and  the  inclusion of  village  fixed  effects  does not  
change  the coefficients, hence  
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Table 6 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-districts 
Total Expenditures and Total Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
Change in Income Logs Levels Logs Levels F-test
a 
  
Years 1 and 2 
     
31.79 
District 1 















































Years 2 and 3     65.39 







































t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 a Using log form of the equations. 
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Table 7 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-districts 
Food Expenditures and Total Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
Change in Income Logs Levels Logs Levels F-testa 
 
Years 1 and 2 
     
41.66 
District 1 















































Years 2 and 3     79.29 








































t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 a Using log form of the equations. 
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Table 8 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-districts 
Food Expenditures and Non-crop Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
Change in Income  Logs Levels Logs Levels F-testa 
  
Years 1 and 2 
     
44.03 
District 1 















































Years 2 and 3     67.98 








































t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 a Using log form of the equations. 
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Table 9 
Risk-sharing Within- and Across-districts 
Non-durable Expenditure (Excluding Food) and Total Income 
 Fixed Effects No Fixed Effects  
 Coefficients Coefficients  
Change in Income  Logs Levels Logs Levels F-testa 
 
Years 1 and 2 
     
53.78 
District 1 











































Years 2 and 3     32.14 




































t-statistics in parenthesis. 
 * Significant at 99 percent confidence level. 
 ** Significant at 95 percent confidence level. 
 *** Significant at 90 percent confidence level. 
 a Using log form of the equations. 
 
rejecting the hypothesis of perfect risk-sharing within the district for both years. This 
is the district of Attock in Punjab province. For District Three, although all four 
coefficients in logarithmic form are significant and positive, their value is smaller in 
the non-fixed effect model than in the fixed effects model for the second year’s 
regression. The hypothesis of risk-sharing is also rejected for this district. For District 
Four, most of the own income coefficients are not significant. Hence no conclusion 
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about the hypothesis for this district is derived. In the sample, District Three is the 
Badin district of Sindh province and District Four is the Dir district of the N.W.F.P. 
Tables 7 to 9 report the district-level results, using different disaggregate 
levels of consumption or incomes. Table 7 reports the district-level results when the 
changes in food consumption are regressed on the changes in total income. In this 
table, for the fixed effects model as well as the non-fixed effects model, most of the 
coefficients are significant if the log form of the regression is being considered. This, 
again, rejects the hypothesis of the risk-sharing within districts if food consumption 
is the dependent variable. 
Table 8 repeats the above exercise with the exception that here the changes in 
food consumption are regressed on the changes in non-crop income. In the fixed 
effects and non-fixed effects models (in log form), most of the coefficients are 
significant and positive, hence suggesting the rejection of risk-sharing within 
districts. 
Table 9 represents the case when the changes in other current expenditures are 
regressed against the changes in total income of the households. This table suggests a 
mix of results, however; most of the coefficients are not significant, which leads us to 
reject the hypothesis of risk-sharing within-district. 
For risk-sharing across districts, a slightly different approach of risk-sharing 
across-districts has been used as compared to the across-village analysis. For across-
districts, the equation of risk-sharing is regressed using the total data set without any 
fixed effects; this gives the residual sum of squares for the restricted model. Then the 
regression is repeated, controlling for districts by using a dummy for each district, 
hence giving the residual sum of squares for the unrestricted model. Then F statistics 
has been calculated as defined in the previous section. These F values are reported in 
the last columns of Tables 6 through 9. Only the log forms of the regressions are 
used in these F tests. These F tests strongly reject the evidence of risk-sharing across-
districts in the sample. 
 
V.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This study analyses the evidence of risk-sharing in the rural sector of Pakistan. 
The results are in contrast with Townsend (1989) and Rosenzweig (1988). Townsend 
finds strong evidence that the consumption of individuals in the three villages in the 
semi-arid tropics of India co-moves with the aggregate consumption of each village, 
i.e., he finds significant risk-pooling within each of his three villages. Rosenzweig, 
using transfer data, also finds significant risk-pooling within Indian villages. As 
discussed earlier, the calculation of community-wide shock is the main reason for 
arriving at such results. Rashid (1990), using a household survey data from Pakistan 
for the year 1985-86, concludes that individual consumption is not affected by 
individual’s current income; rather, it is a function of both the average lifetime 
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endowment of the individual and the aggregate community-wide shock. The main 
reasons for these results can be the following. First, the study uses only one-year data 
of farm households. Agricultural incomes generally move together in a given 
community in a given year, and hence may not reflect an established pattern of risk-
sharing. Second, farm incomes constitute only 40 percent of total rural incomes, and 
thus the conclusion of risk-sharing within communities cannot be generalised. Third, 
as discussed earlier, the community-wide shock actually picked up community’s 
fixed effects and led towards the reported results. Unlike Rashid, the results in this 
study indicate that the changes in the household’s current income do have significant 
effects on the changes in the household’s consumption, hence rejecting the 
predictions of the perfect risk-sharing model. Since panel data sets reflect established 
patterns of the underlying behaviour of the community, the conclusions drawn in this 
study–of very little or almost no risk-sharing within- and across-villages—are more 
reliable. The conclusions have also been confirmed by Alderman et al. (1992, 1993), 
and are in accord with Kotlikoff (1988), Altonji, Hayashi, and Kotlikoff (1989), and 
Cochrane (1991). Different possible disaggregate levels of consumption as well as 
income variables have been used to investigate this result. A feature that raises the 
importance of this study is the use of a micro panel data set on a sample of 
households from the rural sector of Pakistan. The risk-sharing model has also been 
analysed at two different levels of the economy, i.e., defining two different levels of 
risk-sharing pools. In the first part, it defines the risk-sharing pool as a village and 
tests the implications of the model within village and across-village levels. In the 
second part, it defines the risk-sharing pool as a district and tests the implications 
both within district and across-district levels. In summary, the tests reject the risk-
sharing hypothesis more strongly in the within- and across-village analysis than in 
the within- and across-districts analysis. 
 




Deriving First-order Conditions for the Household Utility Function 
Maximisation of utility function: 
 
Ui, j, t = P  
C





−∑ ( )  … … … (A–1.1) 
 
Subject to household budget constraint: 
 
 Ci,j,t = P   Ca,i, j,t a,i, j,t∑  
  
For any given age group in a given household, the optimal value of the 
consumption can be derived by solving for Ca,i,j,t from budget constraint: 
 





 … … … … … (A–1.2) 
 
substituting this value back in the utility function:  
 






γ   … … … (A–1.3) 
 
 
rearranging the terms and summing over all age groups in a household, we get 
the following: 
 
Ui,j,t = { }P
C












= −∑   … … … (A–1.4) 
 
 
which is the expression in (3). 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Deriving First-order Conditions for the Risk-sharing Pool’s Utility Function 
Given the total risk-sharing pool’s utility function: 
 






δi, j, Hi, j,t  … … … … (A–2.1) 
 
Substituting the value of Hi,j,t from (4) into the utility function: 
 












1 ρ   … … (A–2.2) 
 
Substituting the household utility function, i.e., Ui, j, t from (3) into (A–2.2): 
 
 
















γ   … … … (A–2.3) 
 
Our problem is to maximise the total risk-pool’s utility function (A-2.3) 
subject to the pool’s given resources for any given period, i.e., s=t, total budget 
constraint is given as: 
 






Ci, j, t,  … … … … (A–2.4) 
 
Maximising (A–2.3) subject to (A–2.4) at one point of time s=t, the static 
first-order condition (by setting the langrange) is derived as follows, taking Cj,t as 
given, 
 









γ( )  + λj,t {Cj,t – ∑ Ci, j,t} 
 
taking the first derivative with respect to Ci,j,t we have the first-order condition 
as given in (7): 
 






γ( )  – λj,t = 0  … … … … (A–2.5) 
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